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The harmful effects on global financial stability that accompanied the 
2007-2008 financial crisis (the “crisis”) were largely intensified by loose 
regulatory practices in the United States’ (U.S.) secondary mortgage market.1 
Accordingly, the harm suffered on a global level warrants a comparative
perspective on international securities regulation.2  This Article will examine 
several securitization methods in Europe and the U.S. and derive prospective 
solutions from these existing approaches that have the potential to address 
undue risks associated with asset-backed securities today. 
The negative global effects of the subprime mortgage crisis led to a 
decrease in investor confidence and a widespread disapproval of the use
of securitization in general, particularly within the secondary mortgage
market.3  Contrary to what many believe, the secondary mortgage market
has numerous benefits and is essential to the growth and stability of the global 
economy.4  Unfortunately, poor lending standards and accelerated credit 
extensions have mitigated such benefits.5  Moreover, the regulation and 
supervision of banking institutions were well behind fast-paced financial 
development.6  The U.S.’s regulatory structure allowed banks to increase 
their subprime lending rapidly without appropriate oversight.7  U.S. legislators
must revamp regulatory practices to preserve the methods of securitization 
that are instrumental to economic development.8 
1. Martin Neil Baily et al., The Origins of the Financial Crisis, INITIATIVE ON BUS.
& PUB. POL’Y BROOKINGS, Nov. 2008, at 8. 
 2. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT:
FINANCIAL STRESS AND DELEVERAGING 32 (2008). 
3. See Thomas Hale, Securitisation Industry Battles with Stigma, FIN. TIMES (Mar.
23, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/84b7854e-ed2f-11e5-888e-2eadd5fbc4a4 [http://perma.
cc/E3YS-N6TH].
4. See Miguel Segoviano et al., Staff Discussion Note, Securitization: The Road 
Ahead, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Jan. 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/ 
2015/sdn1501.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5P8-2J5N], for a discussion on the numerous benefits 
of securitization. 
5. See Csaba Rusznak, The Use of Mortgage-Backed Securities in International 
Comparative Perspective: Lessons and Insights, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 823, 831 (2010). 
6. See HELEN A. GARTEN, US FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THE LEVEL PLAYING
FIELD 66 (2001).
7. See Anup Shah, Global Financial Crisis, GLOBAL ISSUES, http://www.global 
issues.org/article/768/global-financial-crisis [http://perma.cc/C8H4-JECE]. 
8. See Segoviano et al., supra note 4. 
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The subprime mortgage crisis followed a sharp rise in defaults on those 
loans that underpinned mortgage-backed securities.9  The defaults were 
largely the result of increased leveraging and excessive risk-taking by banks 
and other financial institutions.10  Many of the world’s most sophisticated 
banks bought mortgage-backed securities without adequate due diligence 
because of the high returns that were associated with unknown, and probably 
unknowable, risks.11  International banks were generally more familiar with 
the securitization practices outside the U.S.; regardless, they were subject to 
the U.S.’s deficient practices because these mortgage-backed securities 
were supervised by U.S. authorities.12 
U.S. policymakers responded to the subprime mortgage crisis with a 
large set of domestic and international financial reforms focused primarily 
13on financial stability reviews and large-scale stress tests.   This legislation 
has incorporated some effective tools.  However, the legislation fails to 
address broader issues with respect to international market interactions, market 
failures, investor incentives, and externalities.14  For example, the banks that
originated the mortgages, together with the financial institutions that 
repackaged them in the form of mortgage-backed securities, were usually 
15 able to completely externalize (i.e. transfer to others) the default risks.
The U.S. should look outside its borders and evaluate aspects from
securitization practices in countries like Germany, Italy, and the United 
9. Manuel Adelino et al., Loan Originations and Defaults in the Mortgage Crisis: 
The Role of the Middle Class, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 1635, 1637 (2016). 
10. Stijn Claessens & Laura Kodres, The Regulatory Responses to the Global 
Financial Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions 6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 
No. 46, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1446.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
H774-JBL6].
11. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International 
and Comparative Perspectives, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 581, 582 (2010). 
12. See id.
 13. Kevin Young, Financial Industry Groups’ Adaptation to the Post-Crisis Regulatory 
Environment: Changing Approaches to the Policy Cycle, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 460, 460 
(2013); see also Rick Bookstaber et al., Stress Tests to Promote Financial Stability: Assessing 
Progress and Looking into the Future 3 (U.S. Dep’t of Treasury: Office of Fin. Research, 
Working Paper No. 0010, 2013), https://bfi.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/research/Bookstaber 
CetinaFeldbergFloodGlasserman_StressTeststoPromoteFinancialStability.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FE2W-U6CF].
14. See Claessens & Kodres, supra note 10, at 10.
 15. FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE
MAC CREDIT RISK TRANSFER TRANSACTIONS 2 (2015). 
 401










   
 
 
   
 
 
   












     
Kingdom.16  Securitization is common in the international market and 
plays an integral part in the sustainability and growth of housing markets in 
numerous countries.17  Although U.S. authorities have looked to European 
precedents for reform, the U.S. reforms following the subprime mortgage 
crisis focused primarily on internal banking procedures, which is contrary 
to the general system-wide approach to securities regulation in Europe.18 
This Article will initially discuss the history and causes of the subprime 
mortgage crisis and then discuss the particular difficulties with the secondary
housing market and mortgage-backed securities.  This Article will then
compare the different methods of securitization in several countries and 
illustrate how these methods may improve the functioning of the U.S.’s
secondary mortgage market today.19 
Next, this Article will review several countries’ regulatory structures with 
respect to securities and bank regulations, and analyze the issues that have 
been addressed by U.S. and European legislators since the crisis. More
specifically, this section will analyze the obstacles to financial stability
that exist in global markets today.
Finally, this Article will propose potential solutions to identified regulatory
shortcomings in order to enhance and thereby preserve a vital part of the 
global economy and housing market.  A key conclusion of this Article is that
a global perspective is essential when developing a response to a future 
financial crisis due to the interconnectedness of the global economy. 
Regulatory effects, domestic or global, will impact the world economy. 
Future regulatory reforms must have the clear objective of reducing the 
risks and consequences of future systemic financial crises, such that overall 
economic growth is not adversely impacted.  This Article urges policy makers
to focus on the financial system as a whole when developing legislation
intended to mitigate undue risk exposure.  While policy makers have recognized
the need for this broad approach to securities regulation, the United States’
legislation post-crisis has failed to account for the interconnectedness of
international economies.  While economic systems necessarily differ according 
to specific needs and political imparities, the growth of technology and
globalization in the twentieth century has created a worldwide interconnected
and interdependent “system of systems.”  Coupled with this Article’s proposed
16. See Yener Altunbas et al., Securitisation and the Banking Lending Channel 9– 
12 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 838, 2007), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/
scpwps/ecbwp838.pdf?1cf0a2a48e2127542110481651a395f8 [http://perma.cc/2M2Y-E499]. 
17. See id. at 10. 
18. See id.
19. While this Article will comparatively examine each country’s method of securitization,
certain intricacies of individual complex financial instruments are beyond the scope of the 
Article and will not receive an in-depth analysis herein. However, they are taken into 
consideration in this Article’s ultimate proposal. 
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broad approach, the latest financial crisis is a very useful exemplar, which
policy makers can use to address issues that remain pertinent to global 
financial markets in order to avoid future crises. 
I. WHAT WERE THE CAUSES OF THE U.S. SUBPRIME
MORTGAGE CRISIS? 
The issuing and trading of risky residential mortgage-backed securities 
led to the subprime mortgage crisis.20  Mortgage-backed securities, specifically 
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), are bonds secured by a pool 
of home and other real estate loans.21  This form of securitization began
in the U.S. in 1968 when banks started pooling together large volumes of 
newly originated mortgages and selling them to certain investment market 
participants, particularly government-sponsored enterprises and private 
firms.22 Mortgage-backed securities held and issued by government-sponsored
enterprises carried a government-backed guarantee on the securities’ interest 
23and principal payments.   Unlike privately-held mortgage-backed securities,
the underlying loans in these mortgage-backed securities originated with 
credit-worthy homeowners.24  However, the complexity of mortgage-backed
securities and difficulty of accurately assessing the risk of large pools of 
mortgages led to the high ratings of privately-held mortgage-backed securities, 
thereby misleading investors.25  Mortgage-backed securities issued by the
government-sponsored enterprises are not rated because they are supported 
by a federal government guarantee.26  Thus, credit rating agencies did not play
20. See Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/business/economy/26inquiry.html 
[http://perma.cc/8245-6NND].
21. Mortgage-Backed Securities, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/mortgage-
backed-securities [https://perma.cc/2U9S-UMN8].  See Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS), 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mbs.asp [http://perma.cc/C8XJ-8VC8],
for a further explanation of a mortgage-backed security.
22. See John J. McConnell & Stephen A. Buser, The Origins and Evolution of the 
Market for Mortgage-Backed Securities, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 173, 176–79 (2011). 
23. Id. 
24. See Wayne Passmore & Roger Sparks, Putting the Squeeze on a Market for 
Lemons: Government-Sponsored Mortgage Securitization, 13 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 
27, 27 (1996). 
25.  McConnell & Buser, supra note 22, at 182. 
26. Id. at 183. 
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a role in the issuance of mortgage-backed securities until the late 1990s 
and early 2000s when the volume of private label securities expanded.27 
A. Mortgage-Backed Securitization and Its Pre-Crisis History 
The “traditional” method of securitization, specifically asset-backed 
securitization, structures debt securities in tranches, where loans are pooled
together and then divided based on maturity and risk.28 Leading up to the
crisis, issuers pooled together subprime mortgage loans (i.e. high-risk loans) 
with high quality loans to offer investors attractive, high-yield mortgage-
backed securities with high ratings that masked underlying risk exposures.29 
Credit rating agencies helped private issuers package their mortgage-backed
securities so that issuers could achieve high ratings for lesser quality, higher- 
interest securities.30  Investors all over the world relied on these ratings and 
sought mortgage-backed securities because they were highly rated and offered 
substantial returns.31 
The mortgage-backed security is the best method for banks to dispose 
of the risks associated with lending.32  Once the mortgages are packaged 
and issued into the secondary market,33 the entirety of the risk is externalized
to investors.34 Coupled with the high ratings that masked the risks transferred 
to investors, this led to a demand for more mortgages to create new securities,35 
and lenders began offering home loans to just about anyone, regardless of
27. Id. 
28. See What is a Tranche?, FIN. WEB, https://www.finweb.com/loans/what-is-a-
tranche.html [https://perma.cc/WY6D-SWHK], for a detailed explanation on how mortgage- 
backed securities are divided into tranches.
 29. See Jeff Brown, Why Investors Own Private Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. 
NEWS (July 18, 2016, 9:59 AM), https://money.usnews.com/investing/articles/2016-07-
18/why-investors-own-private-mortgage-backed-securities [https://perma.cc/8QCQ-T9EZ]. 
30.  McConnell & Buser, supra note 22, at 182. 
31. See Rusznak, supra note 5, at 849–50; see also Brown, supra note 29 (noting
that trillions of dollars’ worth of mortgage-backed securities were issued leading up to the 
crisis because they were so appealing to investors). 
32. Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access
to Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. 
on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 118 (2003) (prepared 
statement of Cameron L. Cowan, Partner, Orrick, Herrington, and Sutcliffe, LLP) (“[L]enders 
had the option to move any interest rate risk associated with mortgages off of their balance 
sheet.”). 
33.  The Nasdaq defines the secondary market as the market in which securities are
traded after they are initially offered in the primary market. Secondary Market, NASDAQ, 
http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/s/secondary-market (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
34. See FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, supra note 15. 
35. Carl Levin, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks, 
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their credit history, because lenders were able to sell subprime loans before
they went bad.36 
Consequently, in the years leading up to the crisis, housing prices had 
risen sharply—nearly doubling between 1996 and 2006.37  However, the 
spike constituted a “housing bubble,” which would inevitably burst.38  In
2006, when housing prices dropped significantly and millions of mortgages 
defaulted, the bubble burst.39  The risky lending practices, permissible under 
the U.S.’s loose regulatory scheme at the time, provided an artificial incentive 
for people to enter the housing market who otherwise could not afford to 
do so.40  The increase in housing prices did not actually represent a genuine
increase in consumer demand, and the high demand for mortgage-backed 
securities was not based on a reasonable valuation.41  When housing prices
dropped excessively, it was virtually impossible to ascertain the value of 
the various tranches of mortgage-backed securities because the underlying 
mortgages did not reflect the actual current market values of mortgage-
backed securities.42 
B. Effects of the Crisis 
The burst of the housing bubble resulted in the global financial crisis 
and the financial turmoil experienced around the world.43  The institutional 
and individual investors that purchased and traded mortgage-backed securities 
36. See Floyd Norris, Banks Again Avoid Having Any Skin in the Game, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/business/banks-again-avoid-having-
any-skin-in-the-game.html [https://perma.cc/5283-9SAU]. 
37.  Kathryn J. Byun, The U.S. Housing Bubble and Bust: Impacts on Employment, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 7, (Dec. 2010), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2010/12/art1full.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/H3ZB-BUVQ].
38. Bubble, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bubble.asp [https:// 
perma.cc/L9NN-LY2U].
39. Id. 
40. See Edward J. Schoen, The 2007–2009 Financial Crisis: An Erosion of Ethics: 
A Case Study, 146 J. BUS. ETHICS 805, 811 (2017). 
41. See Kimberly Amadeo, Asset Bubble, With Examples, Its Causes, and How to 
Protect Yourself, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/asset-bubble-causes-examples-
and-how-to-protect-yourself-3305908 [https://perma.cc/5S78-DMQ9], for a descriptive
illustration of the causes of the housing bubble. 
42. See id.
 43. See Stijn Claessens et al., Introduction, inFINANCIAL CRISES:CAUSES,CONSEQUENCES
AND POLICY RESPONSES xiii, xx (Stijn Claessens et al. eds., 2014). 
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were not the only ones who suffered.44  Many individuals lost their homes 
and declared bankruptcy as a result of the crisis.45  Many individuals also 
faced unemployment; deflated consumer confidence and the associated 
reduced consumption caused profits to plummet and firms to lay people 
off.46  Unemployment rose sharply in the U.S. and Europe after the crisis.47 
Issuers of credit default swaps, financial instruments that acted as insurance 
against potential defaults of the underlying mortgages, also suffered.48 
For example, American Insurance Group (AIG) issued billions of dollars’
worth of credit default swaps, including $400 billion to Lehman Brothers, 
and needed a federal reserve bailout when the mortgage default rates spiked
harshly at the onset of the crisis and the insurer lacked sufficient funds to 
clear the debt.49 
Many other large financial institutions were in desperate need of assistance 
following the deterioration of mortgage-backed securities.50  Merrill Lynch 
merged with Bank of America to avoid bankruptcy.51  Bear Stearns merged 
with JP Morgan for the same reason.52  Lehman Brothers went bankrupt.53 
Many of the largest banks that were integral to global economic support were 
heavily invested in mortgage bonds.54  When default rates began to increase, 
the crisis became inevitable, imminent, and catastrophic.55 Regulators were
44. See Viktoria Ney, Many Americans Ended Up Homeless During the Real Estate




46. See Mary Hall, Unemployment & Recession – What’s the Relation?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/032515/why-does-unemployment-tend-rise-
during-recession.asp [https://perma.cc/4XMW-LMRU].
47. Jens Manuel Krogstad & Antonio Flores, After Nearly a Decade, the EU’s 
Unemployment Rate Is Returning to Pre-Recession Levels, WORLD ECON. F. (July 23, 2018), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/07/eu-unemployment-rate-falls-to-near-pre-recession-
low [https://perma.cc/5R6D-ZJ35].
48.  Before the crisis, the value of credit default swaps was roughly $45 trillion. In 




50. See Nick Mathiason, Three Weeks That Changed the World, GUARDIAN (Dec.





54. See Levin, supra note 35. 
55. See id.
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unable to prevent the crisis and attempted to mitigate the crisis by bailing 
out big banks and orchestrating mergers.56 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2008, the U.S. 
and Europe incurred around $267 billion in losses attributable to the subprime
mortgage crisis.57  The IMF estimated that the U.S. and Europe would sustain 
another $92 billion worth of subprime-related losses following 2008.58 
Resulting legislation59 has many shortcomings, and experts have continued
to express concerns over the potential harm a future crisis would cause.60 
Professor David Skeel, who has written extensively on the financial crisis,
stated, “The longer we go without firm controls in place, the more dangerous 
it is.”61  Ten years later, it still remains an issue whether the damage done
to financial systems and economies can be overcome.62  To avoid such crises
in the future, U.S. legislators should look at the causes of the global financial 
crises as well as the ways in which other countries have avoided such.  More 
specifically, European countries have implemented alternative methods of 
securitization that may be useful for the U.S. to consider in designing its 
regulatory scheme to address the persistent transparency, incentive, and 
externality issues that still exist today. 
II. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF SECURITIZATION
European countries such as Germany have implemented various forms 
of “synthetic” securitization to combine the advantages of credit derivatives 
and conventional asset-backed securities.63 Synthetic securitization is defined
by Article 242 (11) of the Capital Requirement Regulation as a form of 
securitization where “the transfer of risk is achieved by the use of credit 
56. See Mathiason, supra note 50. 
57. INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: CONTAINING
SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS 52 (2008). 
58. Id. 
59. See infra Section III.A. 
60. See Ben Hallman, Four Years Since Lehman Brothers, ‘Too Big to Fail’ Banks, Now 




62. A Decade After the Great Recession, Is the Global Financial System Safer?, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Sept. 11, 2018), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/ten-
years-great-recession-global-financial-system-safer/ [https://perma.cc/2X65-T64L].
63. MARTIN BÖHRINGER ET AL., CONVENTIONAL VERSUS SYNTHETIC SECURITISATION— 
TRENDS IN THE GERMAN ABS MARKET 1 (Deloitte & Touche Germany eds., 2001). 
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derivatives or guarantees, and the exposures being securitized remain
exposures of the originator institution.”64  In other words, synthetic securitization 
transfers the credit risk of securitized assets without transferring the 
ownership of them.65 
The transfer occurs through a transaction where a guarantor and an originator
enter into an agreement, known as a credit protection agreement.66  The
guarantor assumes the risk of the underlying assets without owning the actual 
securitized assets and makes money by insuring the risk of loss. This process
is unlike traditional securitization, where the underlying exposures are 
transferred off the originator’s balance sheet and investors receive the money 
that the asset generates.67 The assets underlying the synthetic security remain 
on the originator’s balance sheet, along with the assets’ underlying exposures, 
such as a mortgage’s default risk.68  Guarantors contractually agree to insure
the losses suffered by the owner of the underlying assets, up to a pre-agreed 
maximum amount, if a credit event occurs in relation to those assets.69  Credit
events are “those events that trigger credit protection payments from 
the [guarantor] to the [originator] within a credit protection contract.”70 For
insuring the potential losses, guarantors receive a premium based on 
the perceived probability of credit events occurring.71 
Synthetic securitization is still very similar to traditional securitization 
in regard to the nature of the underlying assets and the way risks and returns 
are separated in tranches.72  They mainly differ in the way they transfer
risk from originator to investor.  Traditional securitization involves the effective 
legal transfer of the assets to the issuer of the securities and the underlying 
assets are removed from the originator’s balance sheet.73  The investor in
traditional securitization becomes entitled to the cash flows that are generated 
by those underlying assets, whereas the investor in synthetic securitization 
simply receives payments for the risk the investor is assuming.74 
64. A Closer Look at Synthetic Securitization, WSBI-ESBG (May 25, 2016), https:// 
www.wsbi-esbg.org/press/latest-news/Pages/A-closer-look-at-synthetic-securitization.aspx
[https://perma.cc/K2CZ-N66T].
65. EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., THE EBA REPORT ON SYNTHETIC SECURITISATION
7 (2015).
66. Id. 
67. Id.; see also A Closer Look at Synthetic Securitization, supra note 64. 
68. Angelos Delivorias, European Parliament, Members’ Research Serv., Synthetic 
Securitization: A Closer Look, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 583.848 (June 22, 2016), http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/583848/EPRS_BRI(2016)583848_EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R6L3-8P68]. 
69. EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., supra note 65. 
70. Id. at 25. 
71. Id. at 7. 
72. Id. 
73. Delivorias, supra note 68. 
74. Id. 
408
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A. The History of Synthetic Securitization in Europe
European banks have implemented synthetic securitization to increase 
regulatory capital, account for varying costs of capital, increase investor 
demand, respond to regulatory shortfalls, and address the inability to transfer 
assets.75  The issuance of synthetic securitization in Europe peaked during 
2004-2005, with over € 180 billion ($220 billion) of volume, reflecting 
the transition between Basel I and Basel II.76  After the subprime mortgage
crisis and the worldwide crash of the securitization market, European banks 
altered their synthetic securitization issuances to the lower tranches “with 
the aim of achieving regulatory capital relief and de-risking.”77  While the 
synthetic securitization market in the U.S. came to a halt in 2007, it has recently 
gained popularity again in Europe.78  Synthetic securitization’s popularity 
is evident through the actions of large European institutional investors, such 
as pension funds, which began bypassing the middleman brokers and making 
the synthetic securitization trades themselves.79  These institutional investors
have shifted risks associated with complex securities to outside investors in 
order to meet the European Commission’s stricter capital requirements.80 The 
securitization market in Europe has been slow to recover from the financial 
crisis and the use of synthetic securitization is an example of Europe’s attempt 
to free up capital for economic growth.81 
Before this recent spike in popularity, efforts to stimulate Europe’s
securitization market were sparse.82  Although European securitized assets 
were affected by the financial crisis, it was primarily “guilt by association” 
that affected the European markets.83  More specifically, the high-profile
75. Gordon Kerr & Marcello Bonassoli, European Synthetic Securitisation: Presentation 
Slides, DBRS (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.dbrs.com/research/307861/european-synthetic- 
securitisation-presentation-slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/996P-HLUS]. 
76. EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., supra note 65, at 11; see infra p. 420 (Basel I, II). 
77. EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., supra note 65, at 11. 
78. Id. at 15; Daniel N. Budofsky, A Resurgence of Synthetic Securitizations, PILLSBURY 
(June 20, 2017), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/a-resurgence-of-
synthetic-securitizations.html [https://perma.cc/2PNC-VHKW].
 79. Julie Segal, In Search for Yield, Asset Owners Take on Bank Risks, INSTITUTIONAL 
INV. (June 2, 2017), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1505pyc27yrjr/in-
search-for-yield-asset-owners-take-on-bank-risks [https://perma.cc/J6AD-6LMJ].
80. Id. 
81. Budofsky, supra note 78. 



















    














       
 
  
defaults in the U.S. during the crisis have shaped a negative perception 
overseas towards securitization and its associated risks.84  The demand for
insuring losses on certain securitized assets, especially mortgages, was 
significantly less as a result.85  In Europe, however, the credit quality of 
the synthetically securitized assets did not deteriorate as it did in the U.S.86 
The European Union’s (EU) securitization market was more robust than its 
U.S. counterpart’s securitization market during the crisis, and its defaults 
were significantly lower.87  The revitalization of the popularity of synthetic
securitization in Europe comes after years of attempts at revival by European 
regulators since the crisis.88 For example, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
attempted to illustrate securitization’s ability to spread risks in 2013.89  The
ECB, together with the Bank of England, published a rare joint  in 2014 
arguing for a “better-functioning [securitization] market in the EU.”90 
B. The German Pfandbrief
An example of synthetic securitization is the German Pfandbrief.91 As 
a critical part of Germany’s real estate financing market, Pfandbriefs have 
been issued by German banks for over two centuries in order to fund its 
mortgage lending.92  Pfandbriefs are regulated by BaFin.  BaFin is a regulatory 
agency that supervises German business and transactions.93 BaFin oversees
German securities, banking, and insurance and ensures the German financial 
system’s stability and integrity.94  BaFin periodically reports on the state 
of the assets securing the mortgage bonds and oversees the banks issuing 
Pfandbriefs.95 BaFin requires that the loan to value ratio of all German 
84. Orçun Kaya, Synthetic Securitisation: Making a Silent Comeback, DEUTSCHE 
BANK RES. (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/RPS_ENPROD/PROD0000000 
000441788/Synthetic_securitisation%3A_Making_a_silent_comeback.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C42Z-P6ZV]. 
85. See Europe’s Securitisation Market Remains Stunted, supra note 82.
 86. See EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., supra note 65, at 18. 
87. Kaya, supra note 84. 
88. Europe’s Securitisation Market Remains Stunted, supra note 82. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. See Rusznak, supra note 5, at 838. 
92. See id.
 93. Id. at 839. 
94. See Marvin Fechner & Travis Tipton, Securities Regulation in Germany and the
U.S., COMP. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., Spring 2016, at 1, 8. 
95. BUNDESVERBAND ÖFFENTLICHER BANKEN DEUTSCHLANDS & ALLEN & OVERY,
THE NEW GERMAN PFANDBRIEF ACT: STRENGTHENING GERMANY AS A FINANCIAL CENTER 
8–9 (2005), https://www.yumpu.com/de/document/read/4059490/das-neue-pfandbriefgesetz-
the-new-german-pfandbrief-act [https://perma.cc/97KD-AYQN] (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
410
DILLAVOU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2020 9:07 AM      
 

























   
 
[VOL. 21:  399, 2019] Synthetic Securitization 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
securities be equal to the bond value.96  Several years after the global financial
crisis, the German Parliament passed the Pfandbrief Act to further protect 
investors and consolidate the regulation of the Pfandbrief into one 
comprehensive law.97 
The Pfandbrief is an example of a security that meets investors’ needs 
for security and transparency, even in times of troubled capital market phases.98 
These advantageous qualities of the German Pfandbrief stem from its legal 
basis.99  In July 2014, the European Banking Authority published a report
naming Germany’s legal framework the best of various European covered 
bond legislations.100  Like the U.S., there has been a continued positive 
development of commercial real estate markets, which led to the increase 
in issuances of Pfandbriefs from 2010 to 2017.101 
The German Pfandbrief Act exemplifies a successful regulatory framework 
for countries all over the world to follow in order to avoid future crises. 
The Association of German Pfandbrief Banks has referred to its country’s 
most successful form of synthetic securitization as follows: 
Quality by Tradition: even in troubled times, the Pfandbrief is an especially sound
investment.  Its first-class quality and stable returns on investment are valued by
investors in Germany and abroad and, thanks in particular to the stringent German
Pfandbrief Act, it will remain the benchmark in the covered bond market.102 
This excerpt identifies the most important attribute of the German Pfandbrief 
—its ability to endure financial turmoil. 
The German legislature has primarily focused on the risk inherent in 
credit institutions and has defined specific risk management requirements 
for Pfandbrief banks.103 This is especially important in addressing the causes
96. Id. 
97. See Pfandbriefgesetz [PfandBG] [Pfandbrief Act], May 22, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT,
TEIL I [BGBL. I] at 1373, last amended by Gesetz [G], Mar. 20, 2009, BGBL. I at 607, 
§ 30 (Ger.), translated in The Pfandbrief Act, Verband Deutscher Pfandbriefbanken [Ass’n of 
German Pfandbrief Banks], https://www.pfandbrief.de/site/dam/jcr:38daf12b-9478-4ba3-
adde-dfd0b4cfaf05/EN_PfandBG_01_2019_.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8TF-FMAX]. 






102.  Verband Deutscher Pfandbriefbanken, The Pfandbrief Roundtable 2015, COVERED
BOND REP., Sept. 2015, at 1, 12. 
103. DG HYP, supra note 98, at 18. 
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of the financial crisis because one significant cause was the excessive risk-
taking by large financial institutions.104 There are a number of requirements
that German Pfandbrief banks must satisfy with respect to default risks, 
interest and exchange-rate risks, and operational and liquidity risks.105 
Similar to recent U.S. bank regulation, German Pfandbrief banks must also 
satisfy minimum capital and general cover requirements to withstand stress 
tests.106  The large U.S. banks that crashed in the midst of the global financial 
crisis would have failed stress tests long before the crisis happened.107  The
inability of U.S. banks to withstand such stress tests was previously 
inconceivable by regulators until the inevitable failures actually took place.108 
The German Pfandbrief Act is structured to avoid that exact situation from 
happening in the future.109 
In contrast to U.S. creditors, Pfandbrief creditors can rightfully put their 
faith in the due diligence of the refinancing institutions because of the rigorous 
rules set forth by the German legislature.110  Pfandbriefs lack complexity
relative to many U.S. securities and have sufficient monitoring by the German 
BaFin.111  The complexity of synthetic securities backed by syndicated mortgage 
loans112 is also simplified by the German Pfandbrief Act.113  Syndicated loans 
are extremely complex as they exist across the globe, making it difficult for 
credit rating agencies to rate them.114 
The German Pfandbrief Act also differs from U.S. securities regulations 
in that the Act does not have any rating rules for public sector debtors.115  The
United States’ Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented strict 
rating rules following the financial crisis and pinpointed credit agencies 
to attempt to fix the insurmountable credit default risks.116  The member
institutions of German Pfandbrief banks account for credit quality in the 
evaluation of the security’s underlying assets, which is outside the bounds 
104. See Schoen, supra note 40, at 816. 
105. DG HYP, supra note 98, at 18.
 106. See id. at 17–18. 
107. See Mark Gongloff, Stress Tests: Citigroup, Three Other Major Banks Fail, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2012, 4:58 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/ 
13/stress-tests-citibank_n_1342928.html [https://perma.cc/7UZZ-3DCW].
108. See id.
109. DG HYP, supra note 98, at 33. 
110. See id. at 25.
 111. Id. 
112. A syndicated loan is a loan offered by a group of lenders that work together to 
provide funds for a single borrower. Syndicated Loan Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www. 
investopedia.com/terms/s/syndicatedloan.asp [https://perma.cc/R85M-YUBR]. 
113. See id.
114.  For a detailed description of syndicated loans, see id.
 115. See DG HYP, supra note 98, at 27. 
116. See infra Section III.A. 
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of necessity in the regulation of Pfandbriefs.117  The U.S.’s focus on credit 
rating agencies is effective to an extent, but it mitigates the valuable incentives 
for institutional investors to increase the value of their assets and loans.118 
For example, German Pfandbrief banks are inherently incentivized to issue
mortgage-backed loans with higher credit to achieve higher value under 
119 Germany’s synthetic securitization practices.
Rating agencies such as Fitch, Moody’s and S&P play a role in the
investment decision-making process of Pfandbrief investors, just like they 
do for any other investor in global markets.120  However, their importance 
and influence on risk premiums, if any, has declined in the last few years.121 
Instead, investors have to rely on other aspects like the due diligence of 
refinancing institutions.122  Nevertheless, in June 2015, Moody’s assessed 
German Pfandbriefs at higher ratings than they were before.123  In 2016, 
seventy-five percent of Pfandbriefs were assigned Moody’s top rating (Aaa).124 
S&P also had a very positive assessment of Pfandbriefs following its evaluation 
of the Pfandbrief legal framework.125 
Germany’s synthetic securitization in the form of mortgage Pfandbriefs 
have strict requirements under the Pfandbrief Act so that they exhibit
transparency and further investor incentives without inhibiting growth.126 
Similar to the U.S.’s regulatory framework, the Pfandbrief Act imposes loan-
to-value requirements on mortgage loans.127  However, mortgage Pfandbriefs 
must satisfy additional criteria to ensure sound practices, which results in 
less necessary oversight by agencies under BaFin.128  Under the Act, only 
mortgages on certain types of property are permitted and the underlying 
properties must be insured.129  Furthermore, the loan-to-value requirement 
is extended to require regular testing and overall reevaluations when sharp 
117. See DG HYP, supra note 98, at 21. 
118. Luis A. Aguilar, Public Statement, Restoring Integrity to the Credit Rating Process, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/2014-08-27-open-meeting-statement-nrsro-laa [https://perma.cc/33EK-S5VG].
119. See DG HYP, supra note 98, at 2. 
120.  Id. at 12. 
121. Id.
122. Id. at 18. 
123. Id. at 13. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 14. 
126. See id. at 16–30. 





























decreases in prices occur.130  More specifically, when lending values for 
properties fall in certain regions, the lending values in those regions are 
reviewed and adjusted if necessary.131 
C. The Future of Synthetic Securitization in Europe 
In December 2015, the European Banking Authority issued a report on 
synthetic securitization that described the underlying risk exposures associated
with loans remaining in the hands of originators and on their balance sheets.132 
The report suggested that banks can securitize by acquiring the insurance 
they need while keeping the loans they generated.133 
This means that risks are realized through the risk transfer by means of 
credit protection, resulting in a genuine tradeoff between efficiency and
stability.134  The best ways to improve financial stability are exemplified through 
both this tradeoff and through the inherent improvement of incentives in 
the synthetic securities market, which is realized in synthetic securities such 
as the Pfandbrief.135  S&P’s performance data on lifetime defaults for different 
methods of securitization shows that synthetic securitization has outperformed 
traditional securitization in multiple German market indices.136 
A fundamental misalignment of financial incentives played a large part 
in the subprime mortgage crisis.137  The U.S.’s traditional securitization allowed
the originators, as well as the financial institutions that repackaged the 
mortgage-backed securities, to avoid internalizing risks associated with 
the underlying mortgages.138  Thus, there was little incentive to properly 
monitor the creditworthiness of individual borrowers and mortgage-backed 
securities.139 
Synthetic securitization provides a model for U.S. securitization to address 
this incentive issue.140  Originators externalize the risk to investors that are 
willing to take them on.141  Therefore, investors are incentivized to understand
the underlying mortgage risks because they are essentially assuming the 
role of an insurance agent to the mortgage originators.142 
130. Id. at 28. 
131. Id. 
132. EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., supra note 65, at 18.
133.  Id. at 22. 
134. See Claessens & Kodres, supra note 10, at 8.
135.  See id. at 7. 
 136. EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., supra note 65, at 18. 
137.  See Rusznak, supra note 5, at 834. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. See Claessens & Kodres, supra note 10, at 7.
141.  See Rusznak, supra note 5, at 831–32. 
142. See id. at 835. 
414
DILLAVOU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2020 9:07 AM      
 






   
  
  











   
  
    
 
  
[VOL. 21:  399, 2019] Synthetic Securitization 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
Synthetic securitization is also prevalent in other parts of world, 
including Italy and parts of Asia.143  Risk realization and the allocation of 
incentives are just two of the several strengths demonstrated by synthetic 
securitization.144  In Italy, traditional securitization is the more common 
practice, but synthetic securitization has become increasingly popular in 
the last few years.145  European banks, such as Italy’s Banca di Credito Popolare, 
have implemented this method to manage credit risk and improve their 
capital ratios.146  The European Commission has named synthetic securitization 
as one of the main objectives in its Capital Markets Union project.147 
Germany’s use of traditional securitization had been minimal, in comparison
to its synthetic securitization practices, until about 2005, when German 
securities regulation began to better accommodate risk takers.148  When 
traditional securitization increased in Germany, it became a valuable complement 
to the Pfandbriefs by appealing to the increased appetite for “risk-and-
return” investors while maintaining a strong market for “risk-averse”
investors.149  However, the crisis halted traditional securitization in both 
the U.S. and Germany.150  In the midst of the crisis, U.S. regulators clamped 
down on traditional securitization, opening the door for synthetic securitization 
in the country.151  Overall, lending and investing has been altered in many 
market environments due to a global consensus for increased transparency.152 
This Article will examine this international consensus and compare legislation 
in several different countries, including the U.S. and Germany. Ultimately,
the goal of legislation should be to balance incentives for growth in the 
securitization market.
143. Id. at 842–43. 
144.  Claessens & Kodres, supra note 10, at 11. 
145. See Owen Sanderson, EIF Securitizations Funnel Structural Funds to SMEs, 
GLOBALCAPITAL.COM (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.globalcapital.com/article/b16n58kzptd526/ 
eif-securitizations-funnel-structural-funds-to-smes [https://perma.cc/KZL5-ZET6].
146. See id.
 147. A Closer Look at Synthetic Securitization, supra note 64. 
148. See Rusznak, supra note 5, at 841. 
149. See id.
 150. See Sumit Agarwal et al., The Asset-Backed Securities Markets, the Crisis, and
TALF, FED. RES. BANK CHI. 101 (2010).
151. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
and Office of Financial Research 2016 Financial Stability Conference: Financial Regulation 
Since the Crisis (Dec. 2, 2016). 
152. See Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Speech at the PLI 49th Annual Institute on 
Securities Regulation: Governance and Transparency at the Commission and in our Markets 
(Nov. 8, 2017). 
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III. CURRENT STATE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY
Recent reforms across the globe have focused on improving the internal 
finances of financial institutions by implementing liquidity standards and
capital requirements on all global systemically important financial 
institutions (G-SIFI’s).153  These aims are critical in addressing the factors 
that led to the insolvency of some of the world’s largest banks.154  Had 
these requirements been in place in 2006, the global financial crisis may 
never have happened, or at the very least, its effects would have been mitigated.  
The following sections discuss these various approaches by U.S. and European 
regulators and the effects of their intended and realized outcomes. 
A. U.S. Legislation in Response to the Crisis 
Toward the outset of the crisis in 2009, U.S. regulators and central bank 
experts began officially meeting as the Financial Stability Board to coordinate 
future regulatory plans for U.S. financial institutions and set international 
banking standards.155  Although regulators have faced challenges in ascertaining 
effective tools for securities reforms, the task is not impossible.156  Legislation 
focused primarily on the internal financial statements of institutional investors, 
however, has neglected to implement the effective, necessary tools for 
avoiding future crises.157 
The increase in “banking supervision” in the U.S. has prevented banks 
from taking excessive risks, such as lending to individuals lacking 
creditworthiness.158  This is a reaction to the deficient underwriting standards 
leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis.159  The underwriting standards
led to a significant increase in the average loan to value of home mortgages 
between 2001 and 2006, as well as an extreme acceleration of loans involving 
153.  Wayne Passmore & Alexander H. von Hafften, Are Basel’s Capital Surcharges 





155. Policy Development and Coordination, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, http://www.fsb.org/
what-we-do/policy-development/ [https://perma.cc/EP66-CRXC]. 
156. See id.
 157. See Claessens & Kodres, supra note 10, at 4.
 158. See Sabine Lautenschläger, Vice-Chair, Supervisory Bd. of the ECB, Speech at
the Institute of International and European Affairs: Walled Off? Banking Regulation After 
the Crisis (Mar. 13, 2017). 
159. Id. 
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100 percent financing.160  Consequently, U.S. legislators have focused much 
of their attention on underwriting standards.161 
In response to increased mortgage defaults, Congress targeted the mortgage
originators and enacted the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending 
Act to help ensure that loans were not being made in excess of the value 
of the property.162 Congress properly recognized that mortgage originators
are part of the transparency problem, but failed to address the needs of 
investors and the lack of tools necessary to help investors make better-
informed decisions about the future.163  Similarly, the SEC targeted creditors,
ignoring some financial tools that already exist that could potentially increase 
transparency for investors.164 
Addressing systemic risks has been the basis for much of the more recent 
financial policies.165  This is a step in the right direction that will address 
many of the prominent issues that exist outside financial statements.  The 
subprime mortgage crisis shed light on institutional infrastructure flaws 
and the interconnectedness of international markets.166  However, Congress
has continued to focus on protecting the millions of defaulted homeowners 
instead of focusing on systemic risks and more macro-prudential policies.167 
The fragmentation that exists in American banking today is an important 
aspect to note in the systemic risks that still exist.168 
160. Between 2001 and 2006 the average loan to value on home mortgages rose nearly
10 % and the share of mortgage loans that involved 100 percent financing rose about 30%. 
Presentation of Why We Are Still in the Early Innings of the Bursting of the Housing and 
Credit Bubbles – And the Implications for MBIA and Ambac, T2 PARTNERS LLC 4 (May 
7, 2008), https://files.meetup.com/81427/T2_presentation_mortgagesbond_insurers.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FLG5-EZUZ]. 
161.  See Peter J. Wallison, Underwriting the Next Housing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/01/opinion/underwriting-the-next-housing-
crisis.html [https://perma.cc/7TYX-J8C9]. 
162. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o). 
163.  DARRELL DUFFIE, EUR. CENT. BANK, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM AFTER 
THE CRISIS: AN ASSESSMENT 41 (2016), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-
pdf/rp3440_financial_regulatory_reform_after_the_crisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZU3-S4R3]. 
164. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC, Speech at the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce: SEC Reform After Dodd-Frank and the Financial Crisis (Dec. 14, 2011). 
165. See Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Fed. Res., Speech at the American Economic 
Association/American Finance Association Joint Luncheon: Interconnectedness and Systemic 
Risk: Lessons from the Financial Crisis and Policy Implications (Jan. 4, 2013). 
166. Id. 
167. See id.
 168. See id.
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B. Comparison of Current Regulatory Structures in the 
U.S. and Europe 
Mortgage-backed securitization has exposed the weaknesses of the
fragmented regulatory structure within the U.S.169  The U.S. separates its
financial regulatory structure by delegating certain regulatory responsibilities 
to different agencies that have overlapping authorities.170  Consolidating
the regulation of banking and securities may be appropriate, especially given 
the success of the British FSA, the German BaFin, and similar consolidated 
agencies in Europe.171  Securities markets have become increasingly
interconnected, and the U.S’s fragmentation of these markets has created 
regulatory challenges.172  Since the crisis, different agencies have been 
inconsistent in regulating entities that engage in similar activities.173  In
its June 2009 proposal, the Obama administration attempted to address the 
fragmentation issue by proposing to consolidate two government agencies, 
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC).174  However, because this still leaves federal regulation 
of state banks with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and 
the Federal Reserve, securities and banking regulation remain separate in 
the U.S.175 Germany’s establishment of the BaFin federally preempted 
national banking and furthered oversight of banking functions.176 
Similarly, the EU has little to say about regulatory issues within European 
countries and does not divide authority within different countries.177  The
extent of the EU’s authority over banking regulation is limited to cross-
border banking.178  Conversely, the U.S. delegates important and systematic
169. See id.
 170. Financial Regulation: Complex and Fragmented Structure Could Be Streamlined
to Improve Effectiveness, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (Feb. 25, 2016), https:// 
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-175 [https://perma.cc/N8M7-G4S4].
171. See Sabrina R. Pellerin et al., The Consolidation of Financial Market Regulation: 
Pros, Cons, and Implications for the United States 41–46 (Fed. Res. Bank. Richmond, 
Working Paper No. 8, 2009), https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/
research/working_papers/2009/pdf/wp09-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/99LG-XL2P].
172. See Yellen, supra note 165. 
173. See Pellerin et al., supra note 171, at 29. 
174. ELIZABETH F. BROWN, VOLCKER ALLIANCE, PRIOR PROPOSALS TO CONSOLIDATE 
FEDERAL FINANCING REGULATORS 172, https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/
attachments/Background%20Paper%201_Prior%20Proposals%20to%20Consolidate%20
Federal%20Financial%20Regulators.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9ER-HUU2].
175. See Pellerin et al., supra note 171, at 14.
 176. Id. at 45. 
177. See id. at 42.
178. Lorenz Emter et al., Cross-Border Banking in the EU Since the Crisis:
What is Driving the Great Retrenchment? 3–4 (European Central Bank, Working Paper 
No. 2130, 2018), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2130.en.pdf?78e19edfa90 
c63da12986751621a6340 [https://perma.cc/T8MU-2ZD4].
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issues to the federal level.179 European fragmentation exists at the EU level,
although there have been efforts to increase EU member states’ banking 
regulation.180  Nevertheless, countries within the EU, such as Germany,
have a more centralized regulatory environment that inherently applies control 
when necessary.181 
C. International Securities Reforms Post-Crisis
In September 2015, the European Commission generated a legislative 
proposal package with two related securitization proposals.182  The first 
proposed a regulation adopting common rules for securitization and creating 
a European framework for simple, transparent and comparable (“STC”) 
securitizations.183 In this proposal, the European Commission permits
“true sale” securitizations to qualify as STC securitizations, but not synthetic 
transactions.184  The proposal has two components: (1) a regulation on
securitization that would require due diligence, risk retention, and transparency 
with a set of criteria to identify STC securitizations; and (2) an amendment 
to the rules relating to the capital treatment of securitizations for banks 
and investment firms.185 
At the time of this first proposal, the international standard-setters, such 
as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”), the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, and the European Banking 
Association (“EBA”), had not yet developed STC criteria for synthetic 
securitization.186  There was also no consensus on the specifics of these
organizations’ inclusions in the STC framework, and no clarity as to which 
synthetic securities should be considered STC securities and under which 
conditions.187  However, the European Commission left open the possibility
that some synthetic securities would qualify as STC securities if they 
performed well during the financial crisis and can be characterized as 
179. See Pellerin et al., supra note 171, at 4. 
180. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, BANKING STRUCTURES IN THE NEW EU MEMBER
STATES 28–29 (2005).
181. See Pellerin et al., supra note 171, at 41–43.
182.  Delivorias, supra note 68. 
183.  Id. 
184. Id.
 185. Segal, supra note 79. 
186.  Delivorias, supra note 68. 
187.  Id. 
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simple, transparent and standardized securities.188  The second proposal is
similar to the Basel Committee’s in that it deals with banks’ capital 
requirements.189 
The BCBS has responded to the financial crisis with an agenda known 
as Basel III.190  The BCBS previously established standardized approaches
for assessing risks associated with bank securities, known as Basel I and 
Basel II.191  The BCBS created Basel III in an effort to address the causes 
of the global financial crisis as they relate to the “supervision and risk 
management of the banking sector.”192 
Critics of Basel III claim the Basel Committee regulations discriminate 
against synthetic securitization.193  The critics of the Basel regulatory framework 
believe the structure of the legislation is discriminatory because it favors 
traditional securitization.194  Critics suggest that the risk weight in synthetic
securitization should be calculated in a more favorable way than the Basel 
regulations impose.195  The top tranches of a synthetic securitization structure
are often guaranteed by a bank, thereby placing a repayment obligation in 
the company that borrowed the money, as well as the guarantor bank.196 
Basel only takes into account the guarantor’s credit rating and does not 
account for additional factors in its calculation of risks.197 
Consequently, the BSBC revisited its financial agenda and revised its 
securitization framework, which it published in December 2014.198  The
BSBC’s revision came into effect in January 2018 as part of its broader 
Basel III.199  This follows the joint review of international securitization 
markets by BSBC and the International Organization of Securities 
188. Id.
 189. Id.
 190. Matt Schlickenmaier, Basel III and Credit Risk Measurement: Variations Among
G20 Countries, 14 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 193, 194 (2012). 
191. Id. at 196. 
192. Id. at 210. 
193. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA’S COMMENT PAPER ON THE NEW BASEL 
ACCORD 105 (2001), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/ca/isdaresp.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM87-
B9HL].
194. Mikael Harstad, Legal Risks of Conventional and Synthetic Securitization, UNIV. 
LUND (2006), http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1558151& 
fileOId=1564558 [https://perma.cc/8Z2L-W88Q].
195. See Melvyn Westlake, Drive for Bigger Basel II Securitisation Changes, GLOBAL 
RISK REGULATOR (Feb. 15, 2007), https://www.globalriskregulator.com/Archive/Newsletter-
Mar-2004-Drive-for-bigger-Basel-II-securitisation-changes [https://perma.cc/SS2L-V2SY].
196. See Harstad, supra note 194. 
197. Id. 
198. Basel III Document: Revisions to the Securitization Framework, BASEL COMM. 
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Commissions (“IOSCO”).200 In July 2015, the BSBC and the IOSCO
issued criteria to assist the financial industry’s development of simple, 
transparent and comparable (STC) securitization.201  These revisions are
guided by the BSBC’s effort to strike an appropriate balance between risk 
sensitivity, simplicity and comparability.202  This is the latest international
regulatory effort to consider whether, and how, STC criteria for synthetic 
securitization should be developed.203 The BSBC will then determine how
to incorporate synthetic securitization in its Basel III revised securitization 
framework and how the various types of exposures will be treated.204 
Since the financial crisis, synthetic securitization, namely credit default 
swap (CDS) trading, has declined significantly in the United States.205  An
International Swaps and Derivative Association (ISDA) Quarterly Report 
in 2016 disclosed that the notional outstanding volume of these instruments 
had fallen by more than 75% since June 2008.206  A variety of factors have
contributed to this decline, such as (1) changes in bank capital rules, (2) the 
significant decline in the synthetic CDO market, (3) uncertainty surrounding 
portfolio margining, and (4) generally less demand, likely due to hedging 
or speculative trading responsive to lower default rates following the 
crisis.207 
German banks were among the countless foreign banks that bought subprime 
mortgage-backed securities without entirely knowing the risks.208  Large
and small financial institutions across the world bought these securities 
because the prospective returns were relatively higher than almost every 
other investment opportunity.209  Also, the international Basel requirements






205.  For a discussion on market initiatives, see Gary Barnett, Deputy Director, SEC 





208. See Frank Hornig et al., American Mortgage Crisis Rattles German Banking Sector, 
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Germany) (Aug. 10, 2007, 11:18 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/ 
business/bad-debts-american-mortgage-crisis-rattles-german-banking-sector-a-499160.html 
[https://perma.cc/3BLP-E5QY]. 
209. See Dam, supra note 11, at 582.
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rather than loans.210  The magnitude of losses suffered outside the U.S. as
a result of the crisis demonstrates the interconnectedness of the global 
financial world.211  It is now more evident than ever that financial stability 
in securitization markets must be achieved through a global perspective 
and macro-prudential policy. 
IV. HOW CAN UNDUE RISKS BE AVOIDED, OR AT LEAST
MITIGATED, IN THE FUTURE? 
Risk is, by definition, an intrinsic characteristic of any risk-reward 
scenario. Risks are measures of uncertainty that investors must calculate
and are typically directly proportionate to any reward—i.e. the greater the 
potential reward, the greater the risk. Substantial risks will always remain
in global markets, including risks of future crises.  Although risks of
market failure have been mitigated by numerous regulatory practices following 
the subprime mortgage crisis, it is likely there are approaches yet to be devised
that may further protect systems against catastrophic destabilizing. 
The legislative proposal put forward by the BSBC is one example of an
approach that reduces an overreliance on banks and promotes, instead, 
more reliance on simple, transparent securitization.212  On the other hand,
U.S. regulation has predominantly focused on the internal practices of large 
financial institutions.213  U.S. regulators have imposed capital requirements 
on commercial and investment banks to reduce the risks of insolvency.214 
They also have required all commercial banks to maintain certain minimum 
levels of deposit insurance from the FDIC to reduce depositors’ incentives
to demand withdrawals when liquidity issues occur.215  Liquidity issues
have been addressed by granting the Federal Reserve the authority to serve 
as a “lender of last resort” for these financial institutions.216 
The primary objective of U.S. regulators has been to reduce the risks
and costs of future systemic financial crises in a manner that would have
210.  See John Carney, Why Banks Bought So Many Toxic Mortgage Bonds, BUS. 
INSIDER (Aug. 7, 2009, 1:53 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-banks-bought-so-
many-toxic-mortgage-bonds-2009-8 [https://perma.cc/JJ78-475B].
211.  DEPOSITORY TR. & CLEARING CORP., UNDERSTANDING INTERCONNECTEDNESS 
RISKS TO BUILD A MORE RESILIENT FINANCIAL SYSTEM 12–15 (2015), http://www.dtcc.com/
news/2015/october/12/understanding-interconnectedness-risks-article [https://perma.cc/
ZVZ9-MBWD]. 
212. See Europe’s Securitisation Market Remains Stunted, supra note 82. 
213. See JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45162, REGULATORY REFORM 10
YEARS AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION OF NON-BANK FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 9–10 (2018). 
214. Id.
 215. Id. 
216. Id. at 10. 
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the smallest impact on overall economic growth.217  As legislative attorney
and Congressional researcher Jay B. Sykes explains, “[h]owever, as the 
2007-2009 financial crisis has arguably demonstrated, sometimes these 
measures have proven insufficient to prevent financial institution failures.”218 
Thus, regulation and legislation with a more system-wide view, coupled with 
the present focus on internal banking systems, should be the target moving 
forward. 
The somewhat newfound focus on systemic risk has facilitated a shift 
toward a more system-wide view.  This was an implicit concern of the
Obama administration’s proposal to merge federal agencies in an attempt
to centralize the U.S. regulatory environment.  However, fragmentation is
not the primary issue.  The problem remains that even systemic responses
will be ineffective unless they address incentives, externalities, transparencies,
and market failures. 
Germany’s legislation established a financial instrument that encourages 
positive investor incentives and increases transparency through its legal 
framework.  The German Pfandbrief provides investors with a degree of 
safety that is only offered by a select few countries across the world.219 
The Pfandbrief has been cited as one of the soundest instruments during a
financial crisis like the 2008-2009 crisis.220  The EU acknowledged the success
of the Pfandbrief, and implemented Germany’s strict safety requirements 
in EU regulations.221  The EU included many aspects of Germany’s legal 
framework in its policy directives to investment companies (e.g., Art. 52 
IV UCITS Directive), its Capital Requirement Directive, and its Preferential 
Treatment of Pfandbrief within the scope of the European Central Bank’s 
monetary policy operations.222 The U.S. can learn much from foreign regulatory 
approaches, and implement practices such as Germany’s synthetic securitization 
in the form of Pfandbriefs and other international legislation already in 
place. 
217. See supra Part I. 
218. SYKES, supra note 213, at 10. 
219. Orazio Mastroeni, Pfandbrief-style products in Europe, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS
45, 51, https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap05b.pdf [https://perma.cc/256B-EZEE]. 























     
A. Incentives & Externalities 
Prior to securitization, mortgage originators had one incentive: to loan 
money to people that would pay it back, with interest.  After securitization, 
and during the crisis, mortgage originators and those financial institutions
responsible for packing the mortgages into securities lacked this incentive 
because default risks were transferred entirely to those investors who
purchased mortgage-backed securities.  Consequently, loans to risky borrowers
increased significantly.  Originators did not care that they were charging high 
interest rates to borrowers with bad credit because they made their money
and never incurred losses when defaults occurred.  In fact, mortgage originators
had an incentive to pursue risky mortgages in order to offer higher returns 
(in the form of higher interest rates) to investors. 
This is the first and most important issue that U.S. policy makers should
address and incorporate into practices.  This is because economists and many 
policy makers believe incentives are most effective in achieving desired
financial solutions.223  Europe’s widespread use of synthetic securitization 
is structured so that originators keep the mortgages on their books.  Although 
mortgage originators can already issue securities that act as insurance policies, 
synthetic securitization restricts the externalization to the extent that risky 
lending will be more transparent and less likely to occur.  The risks would 
be known to potential investors, who can then make an informed decision 
as to whether they are acceptable given the potential return on their investment.  
Thus, mortgage originators would be deterred from engaging in careless 
lending practices and extreme risk taking. 
B. Transparency 
The risks associated with mortgage-backed securities were extremely 
difficult to ascertain because credit rating agencies helped private issuers
package their securities to obtain higher credit ratings.  Unlike most securities,
the critical information about mortgage-backed securities did not come from 
the market.  Instead, the particular rating an agency would give a mortgage- 
backed security was typically the primary, if not the only, information available
for investors to base their decisions on.  The fact that so many of the world’s
largest banks purchased securities backed by subprime loans illustrates 
the lack of transparency that existed in the secondary mortgage market. 
The absence of market information on mortgage-backed securities contributed 
to the extreme volumes of subprime mortgage-backed securities because 
investors relied on the credit agencies’ prime ratings.  Mortgage-backed 
223. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., REGULATION & THE ECONOMY: THE RELATIONSHIP &
HOW TO IMPROVE IT (2017). 
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securities were very appealing because they yielded high interest rates and 
they were rated highly by reputable agencies, such as Standard and Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch.  Investors were largely unaware of the significant default
risks that came along with the underlying subprime mortgages, hundreds 
of thousands of which would eventually go into default.  These credit rating
agencies likely had serious conflicts of interest in rating the securities that
were assigned to them. 
Large institutional investors certainly should have known enough about
mortgage-backed securities to know that high interest rate loans are unlikely 
to back “top-rated” securities—this is simply counterintuitive. Just like
buying high and selling low cannot be made up with volume, it is unlikely 
that bundling high risk mortgage loans (i.e., high interest rates) would result
in an increased credit rating.  Regardless, the lack of public information
may have violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for nondisclosure 
or fraudulent disclosure of certain information. 
Transparency can be increased by implementing aspects of synthetic
securitization in conjunction with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
Regulation AB, established at the beginning of 2005, as the first inclusive 
set of regulations for traditional securitization.224  Regulation AB lays out
the registration, disclosure, communication and periodic reporting practices 
required for asset-backed securities.225  The SEC revised certain disclosure
and reporting requirements, and implemented several key areas of reform 
in response to the global financial crisis in its second edition of the 
regulation (Regulation AB II) in August 2014.226  U.S. legislators can further 
improve transparency by supplementing the disclosure requirements for 
asset-backed securities and including aspects of synthetic securitization, 
such as requiring public-style disclosure for the resale of structured finance 
products and privately-held asset-backed securities.227 
Increases in transparency could also be realized by tailoring regulation
to the aforementioned incentive and externality issues on a broad and 
systemic basis.  These increases in transparency could be achieved by
implementing the incentives in synthetic securitization: specifically, that
224. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RIN 3235-AF74, ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (2004).
225. Id. 
226. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RIN 3235-AK37, ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES DISCLOSURE 
AND REGISTRATION (2014).
227. Regulation AB/Regulation AB II, CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP: STRUCTURED 
FINANCIAL INSIGHTS, https://www.structuredfinanceinsights.com/resources-17.html [https://
perma.cc/X4M8-RZ7T]. 
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the agreement in a synthetic security transaction requires both parties to 
determine the risk of default for the underlying asset and the amount the 
buyer will pay for the risk of default that the seller is assuming.  This way,
both parties would have an incentive to fully investigate and understand
the underlying assets as much as possible.  This incentive affords more
objective information about the underlying assets.  The SEC’s Regulation 
AB would likely provide significantly more transparency if it was coupled
with this negotiation requirement.
The U.S.’s current regulatory framework will likely allow for complementary
criteria issued by the BSBC and the IOSCO.  Furthermore, U.S. regulators
should focus on the financial industry’s development of “simple, transparent 
and comparable securitizations.”228  U.S. regulators can augment their
focus on internal bank and creditor practices with a similar aim to the 
BSBC’s effort to strike an appropriate balance between risk sensitivity, 
simplicity, and comparability.229  However, this would require a broader,
systemic view of financial markets.  The BSBC is in the process of defining 
criteria for “simple, transparent and comparable securitization” for synthetic 
securitization; as such, the time is now for U.S. regulators to consider the 
STC framework’s applicability in the current regulatory scheme.230  U.S.
regulators have already incorporated parts of the Basel Committee’s agenda 
and can likely implement aspects of these foreign synthetic securitization 
practices as well.231 
C. Market Failures 
This Article’s proposal, although directed at U.S. reform, advocates for
a more collaborative and globally inclusive approach to the regulation of
the secondary mortgage market.  Since the crisis, U.S. regulators targeted
specific banking practices, without making any significant steps toward 
integrating with or including regulatory practices that have been found to
work outside the U.S.  However, the interconnectedness of today’s financial 
markets warrants a broader view to foresee and respond to the systemic
risks.  Moreover, U.S. securities, in particular, are widespread and abundant 
across the globe, and as has been seen from the crisis, these securities have 
huge impacts on global economies. 
Thus, an inclusive perspective is necessary in safeguarding mortgage-
backed securities.  U.S. regulation will better address market failures when it
is done in conjunction with international institutions, especially those in
228. See supra Section III.C.
229.  Id. 
 230. Basel III Document: Revisions to the Securitization Framework, supra note 198. 
231.  Supra Section III.C. 
426
DILLAVOU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2020 9:07 AM      
 
   
 
  
   
   
 
 
   
 
  











[VOL. 21:  399, 2019] Synthetic Securitization 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
Europe where there is substantial economic overlap.  Additionally, U.S. 
regulation will likely mitigate more of the risks associated with the crisis 
if it incorporates aspects of securitization methods used in Europe, especially
aspects of Germany’s Pfandbrief. 
Current reform, which specifies liquidity and capital requirements for 
large banks, is past due for complementary reform that focuses on systemic
risks in a manner which acknowledges more explicitly the interactions of 
global markets.  Moreover, the synthetic securitization methods utilized
outside the U.S. provide insight into how to overcome the structural problems
of mortgage-backed securities. 
D. Globalization 
The interconnectedness of individual countries’ economic systems is 
demonstrated by the globalization of markets.232  Technological advances
drove the world toward a commonality convergence, which in turn triggered 
the emergence of standardized global markets in the early 1980s.233 
Technology enabled businesses to operate as if the world were a single 
entity by transforming communication, transport, and travel.234  “Daniel 
J. Boorstin, author of the monumental trilogy The Americans, characterized 
our age as driven by ‘the Republic of Technology [whose] supreme law . . . 
is convergence, the tendency for everything to become more like everything 
else.’”235  Today, the world is witnessing the almost instantaneous
interconnectedness of individuals and access to information enabled by 
computers, phones, and applications that proliferate across societies. 
Technological forces have led businesses to sell standardized products 
in the same way all across the world.236  For example, agricultural commodities
and equipment, banking and insurance services, and industrial and commercial 
construction have become more standardized since the midpoint of the 
twenty-first century.237  Since then, the most competitive businesses are 
able to offer superior quality and reliability by optimizing the best combinations 
232. See Theodore Levitt, The Globalization of Markets, HARV. BUS. REV. (May
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of price, quality, reliability, and delivery for products that are globally
identical with respect to design, function, and even fashion.238 
In the several years following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, influential
voices in the political, business, and academic communities expressed growing 
concern that the U.S. capital markets were losing their competitive 
advantage.239  In 2008, the U.S. Department of Treasury warned about the
“real and growing” threat to U.S. competitiveness in global markets and 
urged reforms “to protect the competitiveness of the U.S. public capital 
markets.”240 At the end of the crisis in 2009, the interconnectedness of 
global markets and the importance of a globally coordinated approach 
toward securities regulation became more apparent than ever.241  With this
in mind, the Obama Administration proposed financial regulatory reforms 
with the intent of strengthening international cooperation in raising international 
regulatory standards.242  The bulk of these reforms focused predominately 
on increased oversight of the global financial markets, and the global 
financial firms in particular, whose instability caused significant damage 
to the global economy.243  These reforms were introduced during a time 
of increased doubts about the future of globalization.244 
However, the bleak outlook for globalization following the global financial 
crisis was short-lived.245  Trade and foreign direct investment, which were
hit hard during the financial crisis, have generally been positive and strong 
indicators of the state of globalization since 2009.246  According to data
on international trade, capital, people and information flows, globalization 
slowed in 2015 but did not go into reverse.247 In 2016, globalization remained 
flat and may have even increased.248  The Obama Administration likely 
influenced the continuation of globalization through its repeated calls for 
238. Id. 
239. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S.
CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORTS & RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2007); Kate 
Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-US Companies Cross-Listed in the 
US, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 196, 208–10 (2007). 
240. Mallory Factor, Capital Markets Reform—Now!, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2006, 12:00 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/2006/12/05/congress-capital-markets-reform-oped-cx_mf_ 
1205mallory.html#395433835efe [https://perma.cc/U393-K6LR].
241. Barbara Black, Introduction: The Globalization of Securities Regulation—Competition
or Coordination?, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 461, 462 (2011). 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 462–63. 
244. See Pankaj Ghemawat, Globalization in the Age of Trump, HARV. BUS. REV.
(July-Aug. 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/07/globalization-in-the-age-of-trump [https://perma.cc/
UZA8-XSYA].
245. See id.
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a more interconnected world.249  An example of President Obama’s
commitment to globalization was his response to the Brexit initiative in 
Great Britain in 2016, an event which created a fair amount of doubt as to 
the future of globalization, when he said that the “integration of national 
economies into a global economy” was omnipresent.250 
The Economist published a cover story “The Retreat of the Global
Company,” in which it proclaimed that “the biggest business idea of the 
past three decades is in deep trouble” and that “the advantages of scale and . . . 
arbitrage have worn away.”251 Conversely, Jeffrey Immelt, previous chairman 
and CEO of General Electric, talked about the GE’s “bold pivot” from 
globalization to localization.252  These differing views are evidence that the
issue is far from resolved. 
Obama’s presidential successor, Donald Trump, made apparent his
substantial opposition to globalization during his presidential campaign in 
2016.253  In the midst of Trump’s campaign, President Obama argued that 
there was no turning back from an interconnected world.254  Toward the
end of Obama’s presidency in November 2016, he cautioned, “in the years 
and decades ahead, our countries have to make sure that the benefits of an 
integrated global economy are more broadly shared by more people, and 
that the negative impacts are squarely addressed.”255 
President Trump has continuously advocated for a new era of protectionism.256 
For example, President Trump constantly discussed tariffs against China
249. See Perry Bacon Jr., Trump’s and Obama’s Views on Globalization Reflect 
Broader Gap, NBC NEWS (July 4, 2016, 9:56 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-
press/trump-s-obama-s-views-globalization-reflect-broader-gap-n601901 [https://perma.cc/
6FM5-ZVUG].
250. Brian Naylor, Obama: Globalization is ‘Here’ and ‘Done’, NPR: POL. (June 29, 
2016, 6:41 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/06/29/484087513/obama-globalization-is-here-
and-done [https://perma.cc/4L7M-WGDC].
251. Ghemawat, supra note 244. 
252. Id. 
253. Bacon, supra note 249.
 254.  Juliet Eilperin, Obama in Athens: ‘The Current Path of Globalization Needs a Course 
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and Mexico and a renegotiation of NAFTA in his first year in office.257 
On January 20, 2018, President Trump approved heavy tariffs on imports of
washing machines and solar energy cells and panels, which was the first
major step by the administration in implementing the trade barriers Trump
frequently mentioned.258  President Trump’s “America First” approach is
likely to also lead to additional trade measures related to steel, aluminum, 
and other Chinese products.259  However, the imposition of tariffs on China
will likely not have significant impacts on China’s multilateral trade deficit 
because China will divert trade to other emerging markets.260  Additionally, the
vast number of international institutions in place that help the world maintain 
an open yet regulated trading and financial system, such as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
are likely to limit the Trump presidency’s effects on globalization.261 
These international institutions have expanded their mandates and 
increased their oversight since they were put in place after World War II 
to prevent another Great Depression.262  However, since the beginning of
the  twenty-first century, these institutions have become highly contested 
from both the left and right wings of the political spectrum.263  Right-wing 
critics view these institutions as detrimentally replacing market roles and 
restricting efficient, market-promoting policies.264  On the other hand, critics
from the left believe these institutions are tools for the rich countries 
to dominate developing countries.265 Nevertheless, these international 
institutions have been largely beneficial for their member countries.266 
Globalization has been a relevant topic of discussion amongst international 
policymakers at the beginning of 2018, one year after President Trump’s 
election.267  At the Asian Financial Forum on January 11, 2018, International
257. Id.
258. Brad Plumer & Ana Swanson, Trump Slaps Steep Tariffs on Foreign Washing 




260. See Stiglitz, supra note 256, at 4.
261.  Id. at 2. 
262. Helen V. Milner, Globalization, Development, and International Institutions: 




266. Id. at 833–34. 
267. See generally Jason Karaian, At Davos, Cheerleaders for Globalization Puzzle 
Over How to Save It from Itself, QUARTZ (Jan. 23, 2018) (describing the hot topic of globalization 
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Monetary Fund First Deputy Managing Director David Lipton encouraged
Chinese policymakers to loosen trade and investment restrictions in order 
to play a leading role in globalization.268  On January 24, 2018, a panel of
distinguished business leaders, such as Blackstone CEO Stephen Schwarzman 
and Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan, discussed the ways countries 
are gaining competitive advantages in the global market and how that is 
likely to affect the state of globalization.269 Europe has focused on making
Germany and France more competitive because much of Europe’s economic 
success stems from that region.270  The U.S. is trying to become more 
competitive through tax legislation and corporate deregulation.271 President 
Trump’s tax reform bill, which he signed into law at the end of 2017, 
makes the U.S. tax system more closely resemble those of other countries, 
which in turn drives more natural behavior within the global economy.272 
The President and CEO of the Federal Bank of New York, William Dudley, 
also said the debate about the benefits and challenges of globalization was 
a hot topic, in his 2017 speech at the Bombay Stock Exchange.273  He
stressed the importance of globalization’s role in all economies across the 
world and said, “if support for liberalized trade and an integrated global 
economy were to suffer a significant setback, the consequence could be 
slower economic growth and lower living standards around the world.”274 
In discussing the pace of globalization, Dudley emphasized the dramatic
increase in global economic integration, and argued for preserving globalization,
because “economies have become more integrated and interdependent.”275 
If globalization were to suffer a setback during the Trump presidency,
the world would nevertheless remain more globalized in terms of trade and 
268. Enda Curran & Stephen Engle, IMF Says China Must Fix Shortcomings to Lead 
Globalization, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2018, 5:55 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2018-01-15/imf-says-china-must-address-shortcomings-to-lead-globalization [https://perma.cc/
A22E-Q2B3].
269. Biz Leaders Talk ‘Global Markets in a Fractured World’ (Fox Business broadcast 
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foreign direct investment than it was in the entire nineteenth century.276 
Additionally, international activity has not slowed significantly since the 
global financial crisis, notwithstanding the first year of Trump’s presidency.277 
Thus, it still stands unclear whether a retreat from globalization is on 
the horizon.278 The interconnectedness and interdependencies of global 
economies remains and will continue to remain for the foreseeable future— 
it is only a matter of degrees.  Although a country’s economic system will 
always have separate and distinct characteristics from others, policymakers 
in the U.S. and across the globe must to take into account the fact that 
international economies are and will continue to be interconnected and 
interdependent.  This will avoid, or at least mitigate, many of the issues 
that precipitated the global financial crisis. 
V. CONCLUSION: WHY A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE WORKS
Asset-backed securitization has proven to be a successful method of wealth 
generation all across the world. While global markets have recovered from 
the subprime mortgage crisis, the U.S. focused on preventative measures 
to avoid future economic collapse.  The reform in response to the crisis has 
adequately addressed certain intra-bank practices that were causal in
the economic downturn. However, undue systemic risks still exist.  The
interconnectedness of global markets, as well as certain securitization practices 
outside the U.S., have set the stage for additional reforms that must focus 
on international market interactions and market failures.
International regulatory structures, such as the one in Germany created 
by the German Pfandbrief Act, can be useful and applicable and inform
further actions that are compatible with, and supplemental to, existing U.S.
reforms that followed the financial crisis.  The Basel Committee’s agenda, 
which was established to be applied internationally, explicitly mentions 
its intent to consider including synthetic securitization in the upcoming 
Basel revision of Basel III.  In order to address the obvious and persistent
challenges of incentives, externalities, transparency, and market failures 
discussed in this Article, U.S. policymakers must seriously evaluate how 
to capture and implement those relevant aspects of synthetic securitization 
practices that have already proven successful.  Much is still yet to be done!
The unity of effort to confront and solve these systemic challenges is a
generational opportunity and responsibility.  Left unattended, these very
same, and still unresolved, challenges will predictably result in yet another
276. Ghemawat, supra note 244. 
277. INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: IS GROWTH AT
RISK? 6–9 (2017). 
278. Ghemawat, supra note 244.
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global financial crisis—one with far greater consequences that could possibly 
result in political, institutional, and social collapse in the industrialized
world. 
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